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DEFINING STREET, DESIGNING STREET, EXPERIENCING STREET: PRIMORDIAL VALUES OF A SUCCESSFUL STREET

Awoniyi STEPHEN[a]

[a] *Texas State University, USA*

ABSTRACT

The public street affords a significant degree of accessibility: physical, intellectual, intentional, emotional, etc. Different agenda, all prodding the *corpus-agora*[1] transactively, collide in such a public space. Some agenda seem to be sourced in more fundamental origins of personal, collective or environmental being. We refer to those as primordial. The following are proposed, among others, as primordial qualities, conditions, impulses or contingencies that augment the street as "great" public place: (i) The street exists as matrix, (ii) it affords freedom as a constitutive, (iii) it embeds memory as a constitutive, (iv) it engenders dissolution of oppositions, (v) it exists as a site for consumption, (vi) it balances invented space in tension, (vii) it is underpinned by a subtext of morality. These articulations elaborate or extend our paradigm of the street. In such definitional practice, we derive valuable insights about phenomena, are armed to re-interrogate them and broaden our capacity about them. Lessons concerning impulses that might be fundamentally powerful about inhabitation of one kind of space also instruct us about creating other personal or collective spaces.

Keywords: *consumption, encounter, Internet, public space, street*

[a] **Corresponding author**: Awoniyi Stephen, Department of H.P.E.R., Jowers A157, Texas State University, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, TX. 78666. USA. e-mail: sa11@txstate.edu

1. INTRODUCTION

Democracy, in the view of philosopher, John Dewey, is an emotional enterprise (Caspary, 2000). This is democracy as value, but also as practice. The ideals of democracy Dewey espoused include participation, cooperation, and free and equal access, among other things. These are also ideals that describe the *great*[2] public space.

In this paper, street is defined loosely. It is to be understood as including urban spaces such as public squares, marketplaces, parks and so on. No specific street/public space will be used as standard, although the reader will already be aware of some grand examples such as, Via del Corso (Rome), Avenue des Champs-Elysees (Paris), Paseo de Gracia (Barcelona),[3] The Strip (Las Vegas), but also more modest (but culturally dense) ones as to be found in Jane Jacobs' Greenwich Village. There are also spaces such as Piazza del Campo (Siena), Central Park (New York), and Trafalgar Square (London).[4] *Streets*/public spaces are notable for different reasons: history, character of built environment (architecture, monument), facilitation of actualization of personal and social selves, and so on. The current paper engages questions pertaining to personal and social values; it is about public spaces where, to put it simply, people are engaged in relatively free occupation, movement and interaction, in the spirit embraced by Dewey and others.[5]

The street is an enduring public space. Increasingly, protecting its role as preserver of values and practices of public or civic life is important, but it faces challenges. One source, for example, is the mall. The mall claims to be a modern-day city centre. It is, however, usually privately-owned space and so the ideals of a true public space are not necessarily fully embodied. It is a primal condition that people desire minimal constraint on (or greater control over) their actions, but privately-owned space tends to delimit one's scope of control. The mall is a powerful (but civically more enervated) attraction for people in consumerist societies. Patterns of control instigated by places like the mall may sometimes seep into spaces which have historically operated as *public* space (e.g. the street), insidiously eroding ideals of personal and communal life and obscuring the prospect[6] that ought to persistently awaken the collective self to constitutives of the soul(s) of <u>both</u> public and personal life. Spaces that claim to be public but do less to vitalize values that are essential to the idea of publicness contribute to erosion of certain fundamental values and structures and may end up impoverishing social contexts of living and experience. Smith (2003) worried about "shrinking the zones of privacy," and privacy here may be seen in terms of life-space where relevant ideals--such as of liberty--are preserved. On the great street, we are un-yoked from an agenda of subjugation; we are liberated from the element of political technology where attempt is made to canalize everyday life (Foucault, see Low, 2000). When places like the mall shut their doors, we ought to be able to return to the street as legitimate public space (see Crawford, 1992).

Physical aspects and conditions of a great street are familiar: places for people to walk with some leisure, physical comfort, definition, qualities that engage the eyes, transparency, maintenance and quality of construction and design. These may also be presented: use of trees, beginnings and endings, diversity, detail, places (such as points of pause along the sidewalk--e.g. at fountains), a sense of enclosure and human scale (Jacobs, 1995; also Bohl, 2002; Jacobs, 1961). As past observers have pointed out, however, the question of the great street vastly transcends such first-level considerations alone; it begs what environment is able to afford and what people do within that environment.

If the question of transaction between people and the great street as environment were synthesized into a form of theory, it might be constituted of two dimensions: being and doing. On the great street, people's desire [to be able] *to be* and [to be able] *to do* are greatly facilitated. If one looked at numerous aspects of street inhabitation, they appear to be embedded within those two categories. *Being* includes such sub-dimensions as occupation, dwelling in safety, dwelling *within* respect, interaction (as state of co-inhabitation) and so on. *Doing* includes such things as walking, sitting, performing, vending, interacting (as action), and so on. Arguments that follow reflect being and doing as existential structures that articulate the street.

2. ENVIRONMENT OF THE GREAT STREET: COMMONS AS SET OF CONDITIONS AND AS PREROGATIVE: A MODERN "GREAT STREET," INTERNET,[7] AS METAPHOR OR MODEL[8]

The idea of *commons* is immortalized in Hardin's (1968) *The Tragedy of the commons*. The commons is "a resource to which anyone within the relevant community has a right without obtaining the permission of anyone else" or, in some cases, "permission is...granted in a neutral way" (Lessig, 2002, pp. 19-20). The great street is a commons.[9&10] It is so in a number of complex ways.

One model of communications systems proposes three layers: physical (hardware), logical (code) and content (what is actually said/transmitted) (Lessig, 2002). Each of the layers could be controlled or could allow free access/use. The layers could be mapped onto the physical street and in the ideal scenario all would present either free or equal-access: physical layer is concretized street (which should be physically accessible), logical layer is an internal or a structural system of conditions which enables the street to function (e.g. security/safety for all; equal access to information, such as per disability, public language, etc.; right to use paths of movement) and content layer is the set of behaviors individuals actually carry out--freely, as long as "principled" rules are not transgressed.

Another model that may be applied frames the street, first at a smaller granular level, in terms of physical content and, within that structure, identifies different classes of occupants of the commons. Thus, some users are seen to inhabit the commons more frequently (e.g. vendors, performers, perhaps some homeless) than others (e.g. tourists, a film crew). The former category of users roughly parallels Lessig's (2002) "wired" group (or persistent Internet "builders"), those who "understand the potential of...cyberspace and who are making that potential real"(p. 49). Among that group, three aspects of the commons may be identified: commons of knowledge, code and innovation. Employing that model, the great street as commons may be described as follows:

Knowledge: Street denizens possess practical and effective knowledge of how the space operates. For instance, a street vendor might know which street corner offers best exposure to potential customers. That knowledge, however, is free to be evolved, assimilated or appropriated by any other vendor (despite the fact that some might attempt to conceal it).

Code (or means/tools/structures of transaction within the commons): Continuing with the portrait of vending, a known system such as a mobile cart (down to details such as height, wheel type, etc.) is developed and used.[11] To the extent possible, different such systems are in full display and anyone may copy and/or modify any of them.

Innovation: Lessig (2002) has argued that knowledge and code come together to facilitate innovation. Anyone can tap available knowledge and codes to create new solutions. A climate of opportunity is sustained in the commons. Accordingly, anyone is free to devise a way to transact effectively in the public street as long as necessary rules that sustain the street itself as a commons are not violated.

In the commons, every group's sensible contribution is enabled. We consider, for instance, "open code" projects. An open code software carries its source code with it such that the code can be viewed by a user. That means the user can modify the code for own use or use parts of the code freely. Freedom to access, learn and modify ensures that a commons of code, knowledge and innovation is built. For that to be possible, the Internet has had to operate as an open system which enables anyone's innovated code to run. Sustenance of the ideal suggests that "the foundation of the computing environment [has to remain] neutral and [cannot] turn against the innovator." Nobody is thus held hostage. The platform is kept honest (Lessig, 2002, p. 61).[12] The key lesson here is this: open code and a neutral environment build *trust*. As with the technological platform, trust within the physical street-as-commons is based on the recognition that no privileged group has its contributions to public life favored while those of others are screened out.[13]

There are other dimensions to the argument of an open, neutral system: (1) Users are effectively liberated from the burden of mediocrity. Since an individual can tinker with (modify) code in an open code system, she has capacity to make things work better for her needs. On the great street, one has capacity to ameliorate one's position.[14] (2) Collective effort may yield more efficacious ends.[15] (3) The great street allows ostensibly incompatible conditions to coexist: self-interest is present, but altruism also prevails. For instance, tracing history of development of the Internet, Lessig (2002) described instances of individuals (and institutions that supported them) who wrote codes and who gave those codes away for free in order that the *innovation commons* of the Internet might prevail. On the great street, a sense of care towards, and that preserves, the collective must exist to some degree.

Qualities of a space that is genuinely public, wrote Mitchell (2000), are that it is openly accessible, welcoming and allows considerable freedom of assembly. The space also yields to maintenance and transformation over time. Realities of brute life in physical space may partially inhibit the kind of less-encumbered, clearer-eyed conceptualization and experimentation that dealing with virtual space and its own manipulable intricacies permits. Yet, that kind of detachment and capacity to abstract are not intellectual (and pragmatic) means without value. Like physical public space, the Internet has yielded its own forms of public space[16] and its lessons are instructive for maintenance and transformation of physical public spaces. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, we make our technologies and our technologies make us.[17] We have evolved public space on the Internet and the lessons of making public space in the virtual world serve to instruct making our physical public spaces. Knowledge resides in zones of transition--from human to non-human, from social space to virtual space. Examining these occasions of transition could be instructive. Progress into the 21st century ought to consider increasing confluence of human and technology and transitional "moments" afforded. Latour (2010) observed that, contrary to a separation of the one from the other, the arrow of time points towards an enmeshing of humans and nonhumans (p. 51). Increasing interdependence makes worthwhile the effort to consider conceptual translations between morphology of the one and the constituting of the other.

Freedom, fairness, knowledge, opportunity, trust, interdependence, amelioration of one's condition, altruism, a sense of care and coexistence are deep or fundamental, primordial/primeval conditions and paradigms of being and doing. In some traditions, resources that are commonly owned and enjoyed are revered. Protecting them is a collective act, but also involves individual action, action deemed devotional (Pearce, 2006). The commitment of devotion is often a question, not simply of reason, but of an intrinsic passion. It is primordial.

3. THE FORM OF ENCOUNTER

The energy of communal life vitalizes the commons. The potential of community is tapped by awareness of the "shout in the street," through perception of the "value and nature of individual human energy, [of] the city as a community of people" (in Bullivant, 2000, p. 68). Here, one may find "a sense of the everyday" (p. 75) which grounds one in a stabilizing tradition and engenders a feeling of belonging. The street as commons generates community as transactive incident and psychological occasion by serving as platform and condition for events that render the experience of community possible. The great street is matrix.

Jacobs (1961) established *contact* as a fundamental dimension of community within the matrix of the street. We may elaborate on the nature of contact on the great street. (1) The modernist architect, Hendrik Petrus Berlage, conceived of the street as an outdoor room (Frampton, 1992). Thus, the street can be conceptualized as a living room in terms of its being a gathering place, a place where one meets friends. (2) The living room is also a place where one meets and faces strangers. The nature of encounter with strangers is multivalent.[18] It can be meaningful. It can be dispassionate. Two forms of the (relatively) passionate are examined here: (a) personal (friendly or antagonistic) and meaningful and (b) collective, intense and transient. The nature of the former is described, first, by way of an allegory:

(a) In *The city and the city*, the author described what he conceived as a *DöplirCaffé*. It is a coffee house/establishment jointly owned by one member each of two often rival, sometimes unreconciled, cultures. For essential dietary reasons, each has its own kitchen and counter. Both, however, share a single name. They share a single sign and share a "sprawl of tables, the dividing wall removed." He continued: "Mixed groups would come, greet the two proprietors, sit together, separating on communitarian lines only long enough to order their permitted food from the relevant side, or ostentatiously from either and both in the case of freethinkers" (Miéville, 2009, p. 22).

The above, of course, represents the "friendly" condition, but one may extend encounter to a so-called non-friendly condition. Late one evening, upon a public square in the middle of a European city, this author observed a spontaneous, extremely-heated debate between members of two sub-cultures. Significantly, however, no blows were exchanged, a virtue of the great street demonstrated. It is possible to read an underlying text in the foregoing: Presence of an *other*--one who may be different from one in any number of ways--is afforded by the environment, not by one's control. The implication of this is that, whether one agrees or not with the world-view of the other, potential of the presence of that other is a standing fact. The uniqueness and great power of the great street is that presence is afforded either or all. Both forms of encounter of the stranger described above are viable and legitimate. Wallin (1998) reminds the reader of the kind of public space where one learned to face (and co-exist with) strangers, without power to "turn them off" as

if they were on television. Being, rather than effacement, is a primeval/primordial condition (i.e. of being-in-the-world).

(b) Encounter in public space can take the form of the collective and intense. Jacobs (1961) cautioned against applying to public space the notion that "if anything is shared among people, much should be shared," an ideal she termed "togetherness" (p. 62). Togetherness, suggested Jacobs, would tend to drive people in the city apart.[19] While Jacobs did not advocate total anonymity (we have already discussed meeting friends above), the great street should also be the kind of space where, in Sennett's terms, "people can learn to join with other people without compulsion to know them as persons" (in Kilian, 1998, p. 117). Rojek (1995), drawing on Maffesoli, described, *neo-tribal* gatherings, where there is "momentary coherence of people in 'emotional communities'" (e.g. festivals or celebrations). These are groupings of people that ephemerally "attract and collide with each other in an endless dance, forming themselves into a constellation whose vague boundaries are perfectly fluid" (p. 151). Featherstone (1992) also drew on Maffesoli to describe the same "aesthetic paradigm" in which "masses of people come together temporarily in fluid 'postmodern tribes'" (p. 24). In examining persistence of the carnivalesque within sites of consumption, Featherstone portrayed the street as liminal space which affords communitas and anti-structure, a sense of "unmediated community, emotional fusion and ecstatic oneness" (p. 22). Individuality is transcended; barriers are effaced; emphasis is on the affectual and empathetic (p. 24). Rojek observed that the "intense collective affectivity" manifest in these groups is attractive precisely due to its emotional temporariness (p. 152). The great street allows people to come together in an intense, albeit transient manner.[20]

4. "AMBIGUATED" DUALITIES[21]

4.1. Class and consumption

Above, the great street was described as an outdoor living room. The living room is also a place of facades, of ersatz personalities, a place where a contrived self may be presented, where inhabitation is moderated by the way self is to be exhibited (Goffman, 1959). In utmost instances, it becomes a domain of fantasy, more or less. For instance, in the street, the middle and lower classes may engage in emulative practice (Veblen, 1981). People may dress up as they step into the celebratory night street. Mediated by desire for self-accentuation, the public self is exhibited. The fantasizing adventurer,[22] destined for and experiencing the night out, can *think* (and believe) that she or he is involved in a form of memorable enterprise. Describing Las Vegas, for instance, Venturi, Brown and Izenour (1972) observed that "essential to the imagery of pleasure-zone architecture [is]...the ability to engulf the visitor in a new role--for three days he may imagine himself a centurion at Caesars Palace, a ranger at the Frontier, or a jet-set playboy at the Riviera rather than a salesman from Des Moines, Iowa" (p. 58). On the "fashion catwalk of the street," where the artificial is sometimes "more real than the real," people can revel in their new-found role, even though they are "artificial, opaque and 'depthless'" (see Featherstone, 1992, p. 100).

The artificial form of social self destabilizes cultural codes. A system of "structured oppositions," within which groups use symbolic goods to establish class differences works well when "leakages and potential disorder from reading goods through inappropriate codes is restricted" (Featherstone, 1992, p. 19). On the celebrated street, where the middle class emulates the rich and powerful, it may not be possible to tell if what one is observing is truth or imitation. Symbolic power, once reserved for the rich and powerful, is diffused.[23] Ambiguity prevails. Hierarchy is

dissolved. Destabilization of cultural codes results in blurring of differences between groups and lends a color of egalitarianism. Thus the street breaks down barriers. These are perspectives of consumption and according to Featherstone, one view of consumer culture is that there are emotional pleasures of consumption. Dreams and desires "become celebrated in...particular sites of consumption" and "direct bodily excitement and aesthetic pleasures" are generated (p. 13).

The culture of consumption is one of squandering, waste and excess (Featherstone, 1992, p. 21, on Bataille).[24] Excess of energy is "translated into an excess of product and goods" until such growth reaches its limits in entropy and anomie (p. 22). To control/manage growth and surplus, excess has to be squandered. The process of that squandering takes different forms, including conspicuous consumption. It is not surprising, then, that the street, in an age of consumption, replicates that excess, since excess is an inherent part of the zeitgeist.[25]

4.2. Invented or technological space

The dialectics of diffusion--as of the zones of separation between the rich and the middle and lower classes described above--extends to the once-diametrical "states" of real space and invented space as well. Reality is aestheticized as a result of effacement of the distinction between real things and the "flood of signs and images" that we produce from sources such as television and the Internet (Featherstone, 1992, p. 20), but that are also to be found on the street. Effacement of the distinction between image and reality on the one hand, but juxtaposition of elements of both on the other, *indicate* the complexity of the great street (i.e. that both effacement of boundaries, but also distinctness of boundaries--which enables one to read juxtapositions--can coexist). There is a balancing of contradictions. People who are enthralled by the blurring of reality can find rapture/rhapsody in the collisions and dissonances that occur on the great street,[26] but as well those who desire physicality of the world and artifacts--who seek a grounding away from the insubstantiveness of technological space--can come out into the same street, read and experience the brute realities of bodies and objects and their meanings.[27] Both forms of experience can coexist since the street is merely presented and different people can *receive* it differently. Within contemporary culture, Featherstone (1992) noted, the question is sometimes no longer of choice, but of incorporation of ostensibly-opposing options.

There is a subtler third condition, a structural one, nestled somewhere between the desires of those who seek grounding in a real world, but are increasingly assailed and pulled by the realities of an increasingly digitized or signified world, and those who are "completely" at ease with a technologically-oversaturated world. It is that physicalness of the street presents a restraint to (or containment of) increasingly all-consuming tyrannies-of-experience or fantasies that distance humans from their concrete self. "Humanity," observed Bey, "has always invested heavily in any scheme that offers escape from the body" (see Schwartz, 2000, p. 155-156) and, although Brahm (in Schwartz, 2000, p. 155) aphorized that "we are all cyborgs now," that we are "irrevocably interfaced with technology," the fact is that we remain, still, corporeal beings that continue to be inextricably linked to a physical world--and it is possible that our grounding connection with that world will enable us to continue to appreciate its intricacies.[28] This is no longer about desire, but about a condition of the world itself as a substantive entity and also validation of the human self within it.

In an age of consumption, aestheticization of the world through dissolution of codes (diffusion of social hierarchies and interpenetration of contextuality and meaning through mixing of

invented/technological space and real space) offers its own form of emotional fulfilment (Featherstone, 1992). The great street presents and frames a life-space within which oppositions are explored. In the final analysis, the great street may be seen as such in that it presents a generative structure of contemporary culture which can handle "both formal control and de-control and facilitate an easy change of gears" between oppositions (Featherstone, 1992, p. 7). Its facilitation is primordial: it gives space to and elaborates being and the diversities that constitute it.

5. FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS

While the carnivalesque space of the great street permits competing dualities and inversions, transgression or dissolution of cultural codes does not mean chaos. It takes discipline and control to inhabit collective space, discipline to keep flow going when the order of inhabitation is movement, to "gaze with controlled enthusiasm...to tolerate the close proximity of bodies without feeling threatened." To move through urban spaces "demands a 'controlled de-control of the emotions.'" The imagery of pleasure and excitement, of the carnivalesque and apparent disorder rests on an underlying order (Featherstone, 1992, pp. 24-25).

Callicott (1989), noted that there is an "intimate connection between cooperation among individuals in groups...and ethics" (p. 64). We cultivate a sense of respect, not just for individual members of the community, but as well for the collective as a complex and grand order. Callicott (1987) made a further argument in favor of ethical action as a fundamental condition of being for either the human, the group or both. Western philosophy, he began, often has rested in the notion that "the origin of human experience has somehow to do with human reason" (p. 189). From that viewpoint, reason is seen to precede ethics (and resultant ethical behavior): We are deemed "moral beings because we are rational beings" (p. 190). Callicott, however, offered the contention that while ethics may be viewed within the capacity of reason, the former may precede the latter. He wrote:

> Reason appears to be a delicate, variable, and recently emerged faculty. It cannot, under any circumstances, be supposed to have evolved in the absence of complex linguistic capabilities which depend, in turn, for their evolution upon a highly developed social matrix. But we cannot have become social beings unless we assumed limitations on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. Hence we must have become ethical before we became rational. (1987, p. 190)

We are predisposed not to disfavor the things that enable us to live together. Beneath appearances, this "undercourse" maintains its antecedence. In the great public space, a primordial sensibility or condition underlies and broadly frames surface action.

6. MEMORY AND CITY

Monuments are architectural expressions of the collective will and urban artifacts may be seen as monuments in the city (Rossi, 1982). There is a particular knowledge that each artifact in the city carries, knowledge which is an indicator of a unique type of experience that is, according to Rossi, recognizable to "those who have walked through the particular building, street, or district" (p. 33). Calvino (1974) echoed Rossi. He described the city in two ways. One description was by the city's physical characteristics. Another was by way of memory:

> I arrived here in my first youth, one morning, many people were hurrying along the streets toward the market...three soldiers on a platform played the trumpet, and all around wheels turned and colored banners fluttered in the wind. (p. 9)

The city is read, wrote Calvino, as a relationship between its parts and events: "the tilt of a guttering and a cat's progress along it," "the height of [a] railing and the leap of the adulterer who climbed over it at dawn" (p. 10). The mind becomes a honeycomb in whose cells events that bring the city and its artifacts alive are inserted (p. 15). In complement, the city and its artifacts soak up waves of memory like a sponge (p. 10). Memories "cleave to the physical settings of events" (Ladd, quoted in Beauregard, 2003, p. 244). Later, when human and city artifacts interact, the latter "release" their embedded history through memory. Thus, three phenomena are inextricably linked in the existence of the city: the human who builds and inhabits the city, artifacts that the human builds in the city, and history or memory that link human and artifact.

A great street does not happen overnight, so history is embedded in the context and its artifacts. Through history, spaces and artifacts transcend themselves as mere physical environment and become the instantiation of collective memory. Through the elements of the physical environment of the street, there is memorialization (for those who remember)[29] or its mythification (for those who have no authentic historical perspective)[30]. Memorialization and mythification are not sourced in superficial impulses. They are more-deeply sourced in the individual or collective psyche. Human connection to the street is a phenomenon with primordial dimensions.

7. CONCLUSION

The great public space operates on more than just rational rules. It is also grounded upon and preserves deeper ideals of civic life and community. Some of those ideals are directly detected. Others have to be uncovered as sources of meaning that are buried under appearances. On the surface, for instance, a great public space might appear chaotic. Considered wholistically and more deeply, however, one may recognize cosmic order and primordial conditions that valorize and "sacralize" civic space. Featherstone (1992) observed that even in cases when we may perceive apparent cultural disorder and ferment on the surface, there may also be found a "more deeply embedded integrative principle [or set of principles]" (p. 20). In discovering deep structures of civic space, we become armed to redefine them and broaden our capacity about them. We acquire lessons that are useful in understanding inhabitation and experience.

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[1] Objectified body of public space

[2] It is surely already evident to the reader that great is not employed here in a quantitative sense, but in the sense of facilitation of personal and collective inhabitation. This borrows from past writers who have written about streets, public spaces and their ideal qualities.

[3] See Jacobs, A. B., 1995 on great streets.

[4] Obviously, there will be some differences over what ought to be included in a list such as this. Fundamentally, however, all embody certain characteristics or ideals about public inhabitation.

[5] Human definition of things is essential practice. Through it, we remind ourselves what a *thing* means (and this is deep, constitutive meaning) and (ii) we redefine that thing in light of evolving conditions--we occasion necessary transformation. In sum, we memorialize that which is crucial and we innovate to re-create the essential. Thus, defining and re-defining are fundamental acts of *making* human life and society--through reclamation, reorientation, transformation, etc. The current paper, in its goal of engaging questions pertaining to person and society, their values and the constitution and preservation of public space, also engages that practice of defining/redefining.

[6] i.e. [mental] prospect

[7] A modern [as yet, partially] "great street"

[8] This section borrows significantly from Lessig (2002).

[9] While commons as public space is employed in this paper, commons does not have to be physical space. Lessig (2002) cites, for instance, Einstein's theory of relativity.

[10] Lessig also contextualizes commons in terms of *rivalrous* and *nonrivalrous* conditions. In the former, resource is depleted (permanently or non-permanently) by competing use; in the latter (as Einstein's theory of relativity, for instance), it is not.

[11] Note that "code" has been interpreted in a somewhat different sense here--as a physically-defined means, as opposed to a pervasive non-tangible means (e.g. safety, as used earlier). These interpretations are not contradictory.

[12] See the e2e argument in Lessig (2002): Intelligence is placed at ends of the network, where people connect, leaving the [inside of the] network to perform basic level service--fundamentally, data transportation. That is an operationalization of the ideal of neutrality in the fundamental structure of the network: the inside serves all while specialization/special need is met at the periphery per individual.

[13] Other writers have arrived at similar positions (e.g. of neutrality, open contribution) via different articulations. For instance, see Levy (1997) on collective intelligence.

[14] There is another tenable argument that the user is liberated from strategic behavior (such as when a manufacturer creates a code that limits the options of the consumer in order to, for instance, protect the manufacturer's market position (Lessig, 2002, pp.68, 64, 281). Note that this is no longer simply about profit generated within a *free* market environment.

[15] For instance, an intuition is that debugging software, prohibitively costly in a closed code environment, may be facilitated by an open, collective effort (Lessig, 2002, p. 284).

[16] Of interest: A US senate bill in 1994 proposed reserving a percentage of telecommunications capacity for "free, public uses" (Mitchell, 2000, p. 125).

[17] Refer Mitchell, 2000.

[18] Given space available in this paper, only two "replications" (or hybrids) will be examined.

[19] Kilian (1998) also noted such an ideal described by Sennett as "tyranny of intimacy" (p. 116).

[20] Note that neotribal groups can also be formed around non-carnival conditions--e.g. around a common product brand.

[21] This main section borrows significantly from Featherstone, (1992).

[22] This, either on an "ordinary" night out or out on revelry.

[23] Notice that it is symbolic power that is diffused, not real power. Symbolic power may be described as power that is detected, not in its exercise, but in what the observer surmises based on outward appearances.

[24] Since we are discussing design of the physical environment, the reader might be interested in Bernard Tschumi (1996), architect and architectural theorist's, commentary that architecture is excess.

[25] As a "premise" of the culture, consumption is, in that sense, primordial.

[26] Dissonances manifested in persistent collisions as created by technologies of signs, images, fast cars, traffic lights, glamorous or radical clothing, etc.

[27] This is possible because, parallel to the question of overcurrency of images is the question of presence-in-the-world. Concrete artifacts present/send an image to the viewer. There are also projected images such as pictures and text. Embodiment of images as or on artifacts is an instantiation of images--i.e. a dimension of physicality is compelled, even if it means, in the case of a projected image, manifested in/on or transferred to the surface that receives that image. Another dimension of instantiation is intellectual: cultural codes and clues are contained in artifacts. Cultural codes and clues are ideas that exist in the world. Culture is incorporated (see Featherstone, 1992)--i.e. whenever there is an artifact (such as a sign, for instance) it comes with implicit and/or explicit codes, direct or interpreted, by which it is received and those codes refer to a cultural ground.

[28] But then, this is only speculative.

[29] For example, Smith (1999), described frontier memorabilia stores in New York as metaphors for historical conflicts that had taken place in the history of the city. Tompkins Park, for instance, embodied a history of contested inhabitation and became a symbol of political struggle within the city. It transcended a physical setting in which people could gather to recreate or protest. It became a fixture of collective history and collective memory.

[30] After Roland Barthes (see Smith, 1999).